In the last decade defeasible argumentation frameworks have evolved to become a sound setting to formalize commonsense, qualitative reasoning. The logic programming paradigm has shown to be particularly useful for developing different argument-based frameworks on the basis of different variants of logic programming which incorporate defeasible rules. Most of such frameworks, however, are unable to deal with explicit uncertainty, nor with vague knowledge, as defeasibility is directly encoded in the object language. This paper presents Possibilistic Logic Programming (P-DeLP), a new logic programming language which combines features from argumentation theory and logic programming, incorporating as well the treatment of possibilistic uncertainty. Such features are formalized on the basis of PGL, a possibilistic logic based on Gödel fuzzy logic. One of the applications of P-DeLP is providing an intelligent agent with non-monotonic, argumentative inference capabilities. In this paper we also provide a better understanding of such capabilities by defining two non-monotonic operators which model the expansion of a given program P by adding new weighed facts associated with argument conclusions and warranted literals, respectively. Different logical properties for the proposed operators are studied.
Introduction and motivations
In the last decade defeasible argumentation frameworks [18, 34] have evolved to become a sound setting to formalize commonsense, qualitative reasoning from incomplete and potentially inconsistent knowledge. The logic programming paradigm has shown to be particularly useful for developing different argument-based frameworks on the basis of different variants of logic programming which enrich their object language with defeasible rules (e.g. [26, 7] ). Most of such frameworks, however, are unable to deal with explicit uncertainty, nor with vague knowledge, as defeasibility is directly encoded in the object language.
Possibilistic Defeasible Logic Programming (P-DeLP) is a new logic programming language which combines features from argumentation theory and logic programming, incorporating as well the treatment of possibilistic uncertainty. These knowledge representation features are formalized on the basis of PGL, a possibilistic logic based on Gödel fuzzy logic [1, 3] . In PGL formulas are built over fuzzy propositional variables and the certainty degree of formulas is expressed with a necessity measure. In a logic programming setting, the proof method for PGL is based on a complete calculus for determining the maximum degree of possibilistic entailment of a fuzzy goal. In P-DeLP formulas will be supported by arguments, which will have an attached necessity measure associated with the supported conclusion. The ultimate answer to queries will be based on the existence of warranted arguments, computed through a qualitative dialectical analysis. The top-down proof procedure of P-DeLP is based on the one used in defeasible logic programming [26, 15] , which has already been integrated in a number of real-world applications such as intelligent web search [17, 19] , clustering [27] , natural language processing [16] and knowledge management [12] , among others.
In the last years, argument-based approaches have proven to be a attractive setting for modelling knowledge and inference in intelligent agents who need to perform defeasible inferences in a computationally effective way [41, 32, 35] . Given its characteristics, P-DeLP is particularly useful as a tool to achieve this goal, as dealing with uncertainty and fuzziness are common requirements when formalizing Multiagent Systems (MAS). We show a case study where PDeLP is used in the context of formalizing an agent's beliefs and perceptions, along with an argumentative inference procedure to determine which of the agent's beliefs are ultimately accepted (or warranted ). In order to provide a better understanding of such reasoning capabilities, we also define two nonmonotonic closure operators which model the expansion of a given program P by adding new weighed facts associated with argument conclusions and warranted literals, respectively. Different logical properties for the proposed operators are studied and contrasted with a traditional SLD-based Horn logic.
We show that this analysis provides useful comparison criteria that can be extended and applied to other argumentation frameworks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First in Section 2 we will discuss the knowledge representation features provided by P-DeLP, including its syntax and semantics at object-language level. Section 3 presents the central notion of argument in P-DeLP as well as an associated procedural mechanism for obtaining them. In Section 4 we formalize the notions of attack among arguments and the top-down proof procedure for computing ultimately undefeated arguments (or warrants). Section 5 presents a worked example, showing how P-DeLP can be used to model beliefs and reasoning capabilities of an intelligent agent. Section 6 introduces two non-monotonic closure operators which will allow to analyze the behavior of the P-DeLP framework when a given program is expanded by adding new weighed facts. Section 7 discusses related work, and Section 8 concludes. To make this article self-contained, appendix A provides a brief summary of the fundamentals of non-monotonic inference relationships and their logical properties.
Preliminaries on possibilistic Gödel logic PGL
As already pointed out our objective is to formalize P-DeLP (for possibilistic defeasible logic programming), a system that which combines features from argumentation theory, logic programming and a unified treatment of possibilistic uncertainty and fuzziness. To achieve this objective we combine two logic programming frameworks: possibilistic logic programming based on propositional Gödel logic [2, 3] and defeasible logic programming [26] .
In this section we describe the basis of the possibilistic logic programming ingredient of P-DeLP. In a first step, as a suitable logical frame to treat (possibilistic) uncertainty and fuzziness, we consider PGL, a general possibilistic logic on top of propositional Gödel fuzzy logic introduced in [2] , and that extends the well-knwon possibilistic logic (see e.g. [23] ), defined on top of classical logic. Then, in order to have at one's disposal an efficient proof procedure, based on a complete calculus and oriented to goals (positive literals), we consider the Horn-rule fragment of PGL as the basis for the definition of a possibilistic logic programming language built up with fuzzy propositional variables [3] .
There are three main reasons for choosing PGL as the underlying logic to model both uncertainty and fuzziness. First, it has been proved that manyvalued Gödel logic is fully compatible with an already proposed and suitable extension of necessity measures for fuzzy events, in the sense that Gödel logic allows us to define a well behaved and featured possibilistic semantics on top of it. Second, like in classical (propositional) logic programming systems, PGL enables us to define an efficient proof method by derivation based on a complete calculus for determining the maximum degree of possibilistic belief with which a fuzzy propositional variable can be entailed from a set of formulas. Finally, PGL can be extended with a partial matching mechanism between fuzzy propositional variables based on a necessity-like measure which preserves completeness for a particular class of formulas [3] . This is a key feature that justifies by itself the interest of such a logic programming system for defeasible argumentation under vague knowledge and possibilistic uncertainty.
We provide below a short description of main features of PGL and its Hornrule fragment.
The language L G of propositional Gödel infinitely-valued logic G is built in the usual way from a (countable) set V ar of propositional variables {p, q, . . .}, connectives ∧ and →, and the truth constant 0. A negation connective ¬ is definable as usual by stipulating that ¬ϕ stands for ϕ → 0. A formula of L G will be referred as a G-formula. The semantics of Gödel fuzzy logic is given by interpretations I of propositional variables from V ar into the unit interval [0, 1] which are extended to arbitrary formulas by means of the following rules:
Gödel logic G was axiomatized (Hilbert-style) with respect to the given semantics by Dummet in the fifties, but it can be also presented as the axiomatic extension of Hájek's fuzzy logic BL by the additional axiom ϕ → ϕ∧ϕ, forcing the conjunction to be idempotent.
Fuzzy logics, and in particular Gödel logic, are suitable for evaluation the (partial) truth of vague expressions, as in the statement p ="the engine speed is low", in complete states of information. For instance, if we know that in given situation the speed is 330 r.p.m., and the concept of "low" is modelled by a fuzzy set with membership function µ low : U → [0, 1], with e.g. U = [0, 1200], then we can measure the truth of p by the value µ low (330), whatever this value could be. But when there is incomplete information, one cannot evaluate with certainty the truth of p. In order to allow an explicit representation of uncertainty (on top of the fuzzziness), an extension of Gödel logic with possibilistic (meta) semantics, called PGL (for possibilistic Gödel logic), was defined in [1] . An expression like "it is almost certain that the engine speed is low" can be represented in the setting of PGL by a certainty-weighted fuzzy proposition (speed low, 0.9), where the certainty value 0.9 expresses how much the fuzzy statement "the engine speed is low" is believed in terms of necessity measures. In general, certainty weights from [0, 1] are employed in PGL to model statements of the form "ϕ is certain with a necessity of at least α"
where ϕ is a G-formula which represents vague, incomplete or imprecise knowledge about the real world, and that will be represented by a pair (ϕ, α). Within the possibilistic model of uncertainty, belief states are modeled by normalized possibility distributions on a set of Boolean interpretations. However, in our framework, the truth evaluation of a G-formula ϕ in each interpretation I is a value I(ϕ) ∈ [0, 1], and thus, each formula does not induce a crisp set of interpretations, but a fuzzy set of interpretations [ϕ], defining µ [ϕ] (I) = I(ϕ), for each interpretation I. Therefore, in this setting, possibilistic models are normalized possibility distributions on the set I of all possible G-interpretations I. Then, to measure the uncertainty induced on a Gödel logic formula ϕ by a possibilistic model π : I → [0, 1], we have to consider some extension of the notion of necessity measure for fuzzy sets, in particular for fuzzy sets of interpretations. In [24] the authors propose to define
and ⇒ is the reciprocal of Gödel's many-valued implication, which is defined as x ⇒ y = 1 if x ≤ y and x ⇒ y = 1 − x, otherwise. For simplify notation, we will simply write
, when the set of interpretaions I is fixed from the context. Note that, like in classical possibilistic logic, this necessity measure satisfies that
Next we will present some formal definitions which relate the underlying possibilistic model of PGL in the context of our framework. A possibility distribution π is normalized when there is at least one I ∈ I such that π(I) = 1. In other words, belief states modelled by normalized distributions are consistent belief states, in the sense that at least one interpretation (or state or possible world) has to be fully plausible.
Next we define the notion of possibilistic entailment for PGL.
When π |= (ψ, β) for each (ψ, β) ∈ K, we say that π is model of K. Since weights in PGL formulas are understood as lower bounds, given a PGL theory K and a formula ϕ, we may be interested in knowing the maximum degree with which K possibilistically entails ϕ.
Definition 4
The maximum degree of possibilistic entailment of a formula ϕ from a PGL theory K, is the value
It is easy to show that
the maximum degree of possibilistic entailment of a G-formula ϕ from a set of PGL theory K is just least necessity evaluation of ϕ given by the models of K.
In [1] the authors propose a Hilbert-style axiomatization of PGL, mimicking the axiomatization of (classical) possibilistic logic [23] . Axioms of PGL are axioms of Gödel fuzzy logic weighted by 1 plus the triviality axiom (ϕ, 0), and PGL inference (deduction) rules are a generalized modus ponens rule for necessity measures (from (ϕ, α) and (ϕ → ψ, β) derive (ψ, min(α, β)) and a weight weakening rule (from ϕ, α) derive (ϕ, β) for β ≤ α). The notion of proof in PGL is defined as usual relative to the set of axioms and inference rules. In [1] it is shown the soundness of this PGL axiomatic system, leaving the question of whether it is also complete as an open problem.
In order to define a sublanguage suitable for logic programming, that is, enabling a proof algorithm both efficient and complete for computing the maximum degree of possibilistic entailment of atomic propositions (called goals), the authors consider the Horn-rule sublanguage of PGL. We will refer to this sublanguage as Horn P GL , which consists of PGL formulas of the form:
with k ≥ 0, where p 1 , . . . , p k , q are propositional variables, in the traditional logic programming style. These weighted Horn rules of formulas will be called PGL clauses. As usual, we will refer to the conclusion q and the set of premises p 1 , . . . , p k as the head and the body of the rule, respectively. We distinguish between two types of formulas in this sublanguage: facts when k = 0 (empty body) and are simply written (q, α); and rules, written as (
For PGL clauses, a simple and efficient calculus is developed in [1] which does not need the whole logical apparatus of the general possibilistic logic PGL. Moreover, within the restricted framework of Horn P GL a simple and complete calculus for determining the maximum degree of possibilistic entailment of atomic G-formulas can be defined only by means of the following particular instance of the generalized modus ponens rule:
Formally, we will write P gmp (q, α), where P is a set of PGL clauses, q ∈ V ar and α > 0, when there exists a finite sequence of PGL clauses C 1 , . . . , C m such that C m = (q, α) and, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, either C i ∈ P , or r C i is obtained by applying the GM P rule to previous clauses in the sequence. The corresponding syntactic counterpart of maximum degree of possibilistic entailment is then as follows.
Definition 5
The maximum degree of deduction of a goal q from a set of PGL clauses P is |q| P = sup{α ∈ [0, 1] | P gmp (q, α)}.
As the only inference rule of our proof method is the generalized modus ponens, if P is a finite set of PGL clauses, there exists a finite number of proofs of a propositional variable q from P , and thus, the above definition turns into
Finally, following [1, 3] , completeness reads as follows: for any finite set of PGL clauses P and any q ∈ V ar it holds that q P = |q| P . Two important consequences of the completeness result are the following ones:
, whenever p = q; and -if for some P it holds that α = r P , then q P = q {(r,α),(r→q,γ)} , whenever (r → q, γ) ∈ P and q P > q P \{(r→q,γ)} .
Argumentation in P-DeLP
After recalling in the previous section the main features of the PGL logic and its Horn rule fragment Horn P GL , we are ready to formalize P-DeLP by extending Horn P GL with defeasible logic programming argumentative capabilities. In argumentation frameworks, the negation connective allows to identify conflicts among pieces of information, that will be the subject of a deliberative process to determine which one ultimately prevails over the others. In Gödel logic, the defined negation (¬ϕ is ϕ → 0) is rather special, since ¬ϕ is always a crisp proposition. Moreover, suppose we would like to introduce in the language a new, well-behaved negation connective ∼. By well-behaved we only mean that I(q) and I(∼ q) cannot simultaneously take the value 1 for any evaluation I. Then q and ∼ q model contradictory information in the following sense.
Proposition 6 Let Γ be a set of satisfiable PGL clauses. For any well-behaved negation ∼, Γ |= (q, α) and Γ |= (∼ q, β) iff either α = 0 or β = 0.
Proof: For any possibilistic distribution π such that π |= Γ, it must be that
This means that, for each interpretation Because of this observation and the fact that we want to keep the simple calculus of Horn P GL , we adopt the following design decisions:
P-DeLP language: the language of P-DeLP is the one of Horn P GL but over an extended set V ar * of propositional variables where a new a propositional variable "∼ p" is added for each p ∈ V ar. Note that the symbol ∼, although intuitively standing for negation, is not considered as a proper negation connective. It is only a syntactic sugar, as "∼ p" is treated just as another propositional variable but with a particular status with respect to p, since it will be only used to detect contradictions at the syntactical level.
Conflict: a set of clauses Γ (in the extended language) will be deemed as contradictory, denoted Γ ⊥, if Γ gmp (q, α) and Γ gmp (∼ q, β), with α > 0 and β > 0, for some atom q ∈ V ar.
From now on we shall refer to positive and negative propositional variables from V ar * as P-DeLP literals. Then, P-DeLP clauses will be just PGL clauses defined over the extended set of variables V ar * , and will be written in the form (q ← p 1 ∧ · · · ∧ p k , α) more in the style of logic programming languages. The notion of proof for P-DeLP will be therefore the same as for Horn P GL , but will write simply instead of gmp .
In order to develop an argumentative framework for P-DeLP, we distinguish between certain and uncertain clauses. A clause (ϕ, α) is referred as certain if α = 1 and uncertain, otherwise. Moreover, a P-DeLP program is a set of PDeLP clauses in which we distinguish certain from uncertain information. As additional requirement, certain knowledge is required to be non-contradictory. Formally:
Definition 7 A P-DeLP program P (or just program P) is a pair (Π, ∆), where Π is a non-contradictory finite set of certain clauses, and ∆ is a finite set of uncertain clauses.
Next we will introduce the notion of argument in P-DeLP. Informally, an argument A is a tentative proof (as it relies to some extent on uncertain, possibilistic information) from a consistent set of clauses supporting a given conclusion Q with a necessity measure α.
Definition 8 Given a P-DeLP program P = (Π, ∆), a set A ⊆ ∆ of uncertain clauses is an argument for a goal Q with necessity degree
α > 0, denoted A, Q, α , iff: (1) Π ∪ A is non contradictory; (2) α = max{β ∈ [0, 1] | Π ∪ A (Q, β)}, i.e. α
is the greatest degree of deduction of Q from Π ∪ A; (3) A is minimal wrt set inclusion, i.e. there is no
A 1 ⊂ A such that Π∪A 1 (Q, α).
Let A, Q, α and S, R, β be two arguments. We will say that S, R, β is a subargument of A, Q, α iff S ⊆ A. Notice that the goal R may be a subgoal associated with the goal Q in the argument A.
Note that an argument must satisfy certain requirements. First, it should not be the case that A together with Π turns out to be contradictory. Second, the conclusion (Q, α) should follow from Π ∪ A and α is the maximum degree with which this happens. The third requirement operates as a kind of Occam's razor principle [37] on the uncertain information used for concluding Q. It must be remarked that the three conditions in the above definition are inherited from similar definitions in the argumentation literature [37, 11, 18] . Moreover notice that from the above definition of argument, on the basis of a P-DeLP program P, there may exist different arguments
Given a program P = (Π, ∆), and from a procedural point of view, an argument A, Q, α for a given goal Q can be built by computing A and α through the (recursive) application of the following construction rules:
(1) Building arguments from facts (INTF):
Building arguments from program rules by applying the modus ponens rule (MPA):
For simplicity, we will write P |∼ A, Q, α to denote that there is a (finite) sequence of applications of the INTF and MPA rules leading to the argument A, Q, α .
The basic idea with the argument construction procedure is to keep a trace of the set A of all uncertain information used to derive a given goal Q with (maximum) necessity degree α. Appropriate preconditions ensure that the obtained argument is in accordance with conditions (1), (2) and (3) in Def. 8. Namely, given a program P, rule INTF allows to construct arguments from facts. An empty argument can be obtained for any certain fact in P. An argument concluding an uncertain fact (Q, α) in P can be derived whenever assuming (Q, α) is not contradictory wrt the set Π in P and that Q can not be proved from Π with a necessity degree greater or equal than α. Rule MPA account for the use of modus ponens, both with certain and defeasible rules. It assumes the existence of an argument for every literal in the antecedent of the rule. Then, in a such a case, the MPA rule is applicable whenever no contradiction results when putting together Π, the sets A 1 , . . . , A k corresponding to the arguments for the antecedents of the rule and the rule (
when β < 1, and whenever it is strictly necessary to consider all these clauses in order to prove Q with a greater necessity degree.
The completeness of the INTF and MPA rules for constructing arguments is formally stated in the next proposition. Proof: One direction is easy since, by definition, rules INTF and MPA yield arguments as conclusions (notice that the pre-conditions of the rules ensure this), hence if P |∼ A, Q, α then A, Q, α is an argument. Conversely, let us assume that A, Q, α is an argument. In particular then α is the greatest degree of deduction of Q from Π ∪ A, that is, Π ∪ A (Q, α) and hence there is a proof κ of (Q, α) from Π ∪ A using only the GMP rule. Moreover, we can assume that the proof consists of sequence of clauses
-as usual, each clause C i either belongs to Π ∪ A or it has been obtained from previous ones by the application of the GMP rule, -β i is the maximum degree of deduction of R i from Π ∪ A -the sequence cannot be simplified, in the sense that all clauses C i are necessary in.
In particular, by this construction, one has A m+1 = A, Q, α . And it is clear that then: Therefore, in this way we have shown that A, Q, α can be built by applications of the INTF and MPA rules, and hence that P |∼ A, Q, α . 2
Computing Warrant in P-DeLP
Given a program and a particular context, it can be the case that there exist arguments supporting contradictory literals. This is formalized next by the notions of counterargument and defeat. In what follows, for a given goal Q, we will write ∼ Q as an abbreviation to denote "∼ q" if Q ≡ q and "q" if Q ≡ ∼ q.
Definition 10 Let P be a P-DeLP program, and let A 1 , Q 1 , α 1 and A 2 , Q 2 , α 2 be two arguments wrt P. We will say that
Since arguments rely on uncertain and hence defeasible information, conflicts among arguments may be resolved by comparing their strength. Therefore, a notion of defeat amounts to establish a preference criterion on conflicting arguments. In our framework, it seems natural to define it on the basis of necessity degrees associated with arguments [20] .
Definition 11 Let P be a P-DeLP program and let the argument
As already mentioned, argument-based inference involves a dialectical process in which arguments are compared in order to determine which beliefs are ultimately accepted (or warranted ) on the basis of a given knowledge base. In the case of argument-based logic programming, such knowledge base is given by the underlying logic program (in our case, a P-DeLP program). Skeptical argument-based semantics [25, 34] are commonly used for computing warranted arguments. The intuition behind such skeptical approaches to the notion of warrant can be defined as follows:
is in turn defeated by a warranted argument.
In P-DeLP, as in most argumentation systems [18, 34] , this intuition is formalized in terms of an exhaustive dialectical analysis of all possible argumentation lines rooted in a given argument. An argumentation line starting in an argument
. . ] that can be thought of as an exchange of arguments between two parties, a proponent (evenly-indexed arguments) and an opponent (oddlyindexed arguments). Each A i , Q i , α i is a defeater for the previous argument
Moreover, in order to avoid fallacious reasoning, argumentation theory imposes three additional constraints on such an argument exchange to be considered rationally acceptable wrt a P-DeLP program P, namely:
(1) Non-contradiction: given an argumentation line λ, the set of arguments of the proponent (resp. opponent) should be non-contradictory wrt P.
(2) Progressive argumentation: every blocking defeater
2 Non-contradiction for a set of arguments is defined as follows:
The first condition disallows the use of contradictory information on either side (proponent or opponent). The second condition enforces the use of a stronger argument to defeat an argument which acts as a blocking defeater. We will generalize the use of the term "warranted" for applying it to both goals and arguments: whenever a goal Q is warranted on the basis of a given argument A, Q, α as specified in Def. 12, we will also say that the argument A, Q, α is warranted. Moreover, we will write P |∼ w A, Q, α to denote that the argument A, Q, α is warranted wrt P.
For a given program P, a P-DeLP interpreter will find an answer for a goal Q by determining whether Q is supported by some warranted argument A, Q, α . Different doxastic attitudes are distinguished when providing an answer for the goal Q (according to the associated status of warrant), and additional refinements have been also studied to speed up the inference procedure. An in-depth discussion of these aspects can be found elsewhere [21] .
5 A Case Study: modelling an intelligent agent in P-DeLP
Next we will present an example which illustrates how P-DeLP can be used to model the beliefs and reasoning capabilities of an agent. Consider an intelligent agent controlling an engine with three switches sw1, sw2 and sw3. These switches regulate different features of the engine, such as pumping system, speed, etc. This agent may have the following certain and uncertain knowledge about how this engine works, e.g.: • If the pump is clogged, then the engine gets no fuel.
• When sw1 is on, normally fuel is pumped properly.
• When fuel is pumped properly, fuel seems to work ok.
• When sw2 is on, usually oil is pumped.
• When oil is pumped, usually it works ok.
• When there is oil and fuel, usually the engine works ok.
• When there is heat, then the engine is usually not ok.
• When there is heat, normally there are oil problems.
• When fuel is pumped and speed is low, then there are reasons to believe that the pump is clogged.
• When sw2 is on, usually speed is low.
• When sw2 and sw3 are on, usually speed is not low.
• When sw3 is on, usually fuel is ok.
Suppose also that the agent knows some particular facts: sw1, sw2 and sw3 are on, and there is heat. The knowledge of such an agent can be modelled by the program P eng shown in Fig. 1 , where the finite set of certain clauses (i.e. Π) is from clause (1) to (5) , and the finite set of uncertain clauses (i.e. ∆) is from clause (6) to (16) . Note that uncertainty is assessed in terms of different necessity measures. From the P-DeLP program in Fig. 1 different arguments can be derived using the procedural rules defined in Section 3. Thus, for example, the argument B, f uel ok, 0.3 can be derived from P eng as follows:
ii) B , pump f uel, 0.6 from (6) and i) via MPA.
iii) B, f uel ok, 0.3 from (7) and ii) via MPA.
where B = {(pump fuel ← sw1 , 0.6)} and
Similarly, an argument C, oil ok, 0.8 can be derived from P eng using the rules (3), (8) and (9) via INTF, MPA, and MPA, resp., with Let us assume that the agent is in charge of controlling the engine, answering queries from other agents (e.g. a supervisor agent) about the status of the engine. For instance, the query ? − (engine ok, 0.8) corresponds with proving whether the engine works ok with a certainty degree of at least 0.8. In order to answer this query, the agent will apply the procedure described in the previous sections: first will compute an argument supporting engine ok, and then will perform a recursive analysis of defeaters for these arguments, computing its associated dialectical tree.
In this particular example, the agent will find an argument supporting the conclusion engine ok, namely A 1 , engine ok, 0.3 . A counteragument (see Def. 10) for the argument A 1 , engine ok, 0.3 can be found, namely the argument A 2 , ∼ f uel ok, 0.6 , obtained from (2), (3), (6) , (14), (13) 
There are no more arguments to consider. As a consequence, there are three acceptable argumentation lines rooted in A 1 , engine ok, 0.3 , namely: In a MAS context, intelligent agents will encode their knowledge about the world using a P-DeLP program. Figure 2 outlines the different elements associated with a P-DeLP-based agent. Clearly, our agent will be usually performing its activities in a dynamic environment, so that it should also be able to reason, plan, and act according to new perceptions from the outside world. Such perceptions will be sensed by the agent, integrating them into its current beliefs. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that such perceptions constitute new facts to be added to the agent's knowledge base. As already stated in the introduction, fuzzy propositions provide us with a suitable representation model as our agent will probably have vague or imprecise information about the real world, as its sensors are not perfect devices.
Defining a generic procedure for updating the agent's knowledge base is not easy, as completely new incoming information (e.g. facts with new predicate names) might result in the strict knowledge Π becoming contradictory (see Def. 7). In some particular cases the agent will only perceive changes in the Fig. 2 . A P-DeLP-based agent in a MAS context necessity measure of the already known facts (e.g. the agent has a fact (heat, 1) in the knowledge base, but the sensed temperature has changed, modelled by a new fact (heat, 0.8)). In such cases, a simple but effective strategy can be applied, similar as the one suggested in [14] . We will make the assumption that new perceptions always supersede old ones, so that a if a new perception (p, value) is sensed at time t, and the agent has already a fact (p, value ) in its strict knowledge base Π, then the updated knowledge base will be computed as Π \ {(p, value )} ∪ {(p, value)}.
Logical properties of argument and warrant in P-DeLP
As explained in the previous Section, intelligent agents can encode their knowledge about the world in terms of a P-DeLP program P. New perceptions can modify the agent's current knowledge, altering the set of facts in P. In this context, it is interesting to analyze the existing inference abilities of our agent in terms of deduction, arguments and warrants.
In order to do this, we will define different inference operators associated with deduction based on strict knowledge, argument derivation and computation of warranted goals. We refer to such operators as closure operators in order to stress the fact that their output is associated with considering all new weighted facts that can be obtained by computing deductions based on strict knowledge, arguments or warrants from a given program P. Our aim is to study the inference abilities of a P-DeLP agent in terms of the logical properties associated with these operators.
For our characterization, we will identify three distinguished sets Lit , Lit , and Lit w associated with any program P, corresponding to those literals which are supported by deduction from strict knowledge, supported by arguments, and supported by warranted arguments, respectively. Formally: Definition 13 Let P be a P-DeLP program. We define the sets Lit (P), Lit (P), and Lit w (P) associated with P as follows: On the basis of these distinguished sets, we will define three closure operators which, given a program P, compute a new P-DeLP program P whose facts are precisely those given by the three distinguished sets given in Def. 13, while the existing rules in P are maintained.
Definition 14
Let P be a P-DeLP program. We define the closure operators C , C and C w associated with P as follows:
Operator C computes a new program P based on the rules of P along with those facts (Q, 1) which can be deduced from the strict knowledge in P. 5 Operator C computes a new program P based on the rules of P along with those facts which are supported by arguments based on P. The output P incorporates a new uncertain fact (Q, α) whenever there exists an argument A, Q, α in P. Finally, operator C w computes a subset of C , namely the program resulting from the rules in P along with all those new facts which correspond to conclusions of warranted arguments in P. Notice that C may contain contradictory knowledge (i.e. it may be the case that two arguments A 1 , Q, α and A 2 , ∼ Q, β could be inferred from a given program P).
Proposition 15 Operators C , C and C w are well-defined (ie, given a PDeLP program P as input, the associated output is also a P-DeLP program P'). Besides, they satisfy the following relationship: C (P) ⊆ C w (P) ⊆ C (P).
Proof: Given a P-DeLP program P, we want to determine that C (P), C (P) and C w (P) are also programs. From Def. 13 and Def. 14, it is clear that all operators return syntactically valid programs as their output, as Lit , Lit and Lit w correspond always to facts in P-DeLP. From Def. 7, it remains to check that the strict knowledge C (P) Π (analogously for C (P) and C w (P)) is not a contradictory set of P-DeLP clauses. Let us suppose that C (P) Π is contradictory. By definition of C , this is only possible if P Π is itself contradictory, which cannot be the case, as P is a P-DeLP program (absurd). Consequently, C (P) is a P-DeLP program. The same line of reasoning applies for C (P) and C w (P).
The inclusion relationship C (P) ⊆ C (P) holds as it is straightforward to see that P (Q, 1) iff P| ∼ ∅, Q, 1 . Since every warranted argument is an argument wrt P, a similar analysis applies to conclude that C w (P) ⊆ C (P)
2
Next we will analyze different logical properties for deduction from strict knowledge, argument construction and warrant in P-DeLP, on the basis of the operators defined before. A summary of the logical properties under consideration can be found in the Appendix A.
Logical properties for C
Clearly inclusion does not hold for C . A counterexample suffices; consider
Proposition 16 The operator C satisfies inclusion and idempotence.
Proof: Inclusion holds trivially, as
Proposition 17
The operator C satisfies idempotence, i.e. C (P) = C (C (P)).
Proof: (By double inclusion) 1) C (P) ⊆ C (C (P)) holds trivially, by definition of C (Def. 14).
2) We must prove that C (C (P)) ⊆ C (P). In other words, we must prove that if (R, β) ∈ C (C (P)), then (R, β) ∈ C (P). By definition,
Clearly, if (R, β) ∈ C (P), there is nothing to prove. We can reduce our original problem to the following formulation:
We will prove this statement by induction on the number of steps required for the proof in A 1 , Q, α . 
Hence equation 2 holds.
Inductive hypothesis: Let us assume that equation 2 holds for all proofs of length 1 < k. We will show that it also holds for proofs of length k.
Then it is the case that A 1 , Q, α was derived via MPA. If that is the case, then
and there is a rule min(α 1 , . . . , α k , γ) . Clearly, A 1 , Q, α follows from eq. 4 and 5. By inductive hypothesis, this means that
But the rule in eq. 5 also applies here, and hence (L 0 , β) ∈ C (P), with β = min(α 1 , . . . , α k , γ), as we wanted to show. 2
Monotonicity does not hold for C , as expected. As a counterexample consider the program P = { (q, 1), (p ← q, 0.9) }. Then (p, 0.9) ∈ C (P), as there is an argument A, p, 0.9 on the basis of P for concluding (p, 0.9), with A ={ (p ← q, 0.9) }. However, (p, 0.9) ∈ C (P ∪ {(∼ p, 1)}) (as no argument for (p, 0.9) could exist, as condition 2 in Def. 8 would be violated). Semimonotonicity is an interesting property for analyzing non-monotonic consequence relationships. It is satisfied if all defeasible consequences from a given theory are preserved when the theory is augmented with new defeasible information.
Proposition 18
The operator C satisfies semi-monotonicity when new defeasible information is added, i.e. C (P 1 ) ⊆ C (P 1 ∪ P 2 ).
Proof: Follows directly from the structure of the inference rules for | ∼ . Suppose P 1 | ∼ A, Q, α , and consider the program P 1 ∪P 2 as stated above. Clearly, A, Q, α can be derived from P 1 ∪P 2 by applying the same sequence of steps as in P 1 | ∼ A, Q, α , since all preconditions in inference rules are defined wrt P Π 1 , the set of strict knowledge in P 1 , and by hypothesis, (
Proof: (Sketch) Without loss of generality, we can assume γ = (Q, α) is not in Γ (otherwise the proof is straightforward). By hypothesis, (Q, α) ∈ C (Γ) and there is a sequence s is a sequence r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n of application of inference rules as before such that Γ| ∼ A 2 , R, β . Suppose now that A 2 , R, β does not include A 1 , Q, α as a subargument. This happens iff from the structure of inference rules for | ∼ , (Q, α) will not be required as intermediate step in the proof of (R, β) iff (R, β) ∈ C (Γ). Suppose now that A 2 , R, β does include A 1 , Q, α as a subargument. This happens iff in the sequence r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n we have that r i+k = s Q i , for i = 1 . . . t, for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n. But from the initial hypothesis this sequence can be built from Γ alone.
Note that the property of right weakening cannot be considered (in a strict sense) in P-DeLP, since the underlying logic does not allow the application of the deduction theorem. Therefore, wffs of the form (x ← y, α) cannot be derived. However, an alternative approach can be intended, introducing a new property in which right weakening is restricted to Horn-like clauses:
The operator C satisfies (Horn) supraclassicality wrt C (i.e. C (P) ⊆ C (P)), and (Horn) right weakening, (i.e. if (Y, α) ∈ C (P) and (X ← Y , 1) ∈ C (P), then (X, α) ∈ C (P)).
Proof: Supraclassicality follows from Prop. 15. For the case of right weakening, let
Proposition 21
The operator C satisfies subclassical cummulativity, i.e.
Proof: Cleary, by hypothesis and by the def. of C , it holds that rules(P 1 ) = rules(P 2 ). It can be shown that
implies that
From Eq. 7, it follows that P 1 ⊆ C (P 1 ). By def. C , rules(P 1 )= rules(C (P 1 )), and C (P 1 ) contains only certain facts. Therefore, as P 1 ⊆ C (P 1 ), the program P 1 has also only certain facts. This proves Eq. 8.
Let us now prove that Eq. 9. From Eq. 7, it follows that every certain fact in P 1 is also a certain fact in P 2 . As P 1 and P 2 share the same rules, clearly if follows that
Now it remains to show that
By contradiction, suppose that (Q, 1) ∈ Lit (P 2 ) and (Q, 1) ∈ Lit (P 1 ). Then two possible situations occur:
is not a fact in P 1 . But this implies (by hypothesis 7) that (Q, 1) is not a fact in P 2 . Contradiction.
• (Q, 1) does not follow from P 1 by successive applications of the MPA and INTF rules, and it does follow from P 2 (by assumption). But from the hypothesis 7, P 2 ⊆ C (P 1 ), and hence (Q, 1) cannot be derived from P 2 either. Contradiction.
Consequently Lit (P 2 ) ⊆ Lit (P 1 ). From Eq. 10 and 6.1, if follows that Eq. 9 holds.
By transitivity from Eq. 8 and 9, we can conclude that P 1 and P 2 have associated the same set of facts, and that it also holds that rules(P 1 ) = rules(P 2 ). Therefore, both programs P 1 and P 2 are identical, and hence it follows that C (P 1 ) = C (P 2 ), as we wanted to prove.
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Most non-pure logical properties for C do not hold. In particular, C does not satisfy the properties of (LL) left-logical equivalence; (CC) conjunction of conclusions; (LA) left absorption; (RA) right absorption; (RN) rational negation; (RM) rational monotonicity; (DR) disjunctive rationality, as shown next.
LL: Given two programs P 1 and P 2 , C (P 1 ) = C (P 2 ) does not imply C (P 1 ) = C (P 2 ). Consider P 1 = { (y ← , 1) } and P 2 = P 1 ∪ { (x ← y, 0.9) }.
CC: Arguments supporting conjunctions of conclusions cannot be expressed in P-DeLP language, as goals are restricted to literals.
RA: Consider the same counterexample given for LA. Analogously, C (C (P)) = C (∅) = ∅ = C (P).
RM: Consider the same counterexample as given for RN. Then P 1 | ∼ A 1 , z, 0.9 , but it is not the case that
DR: Clearly, C does not satisfy property (e), as disjunctions cannot be expressed as wffs in the P-DeLP object language.
Logical properties for C w
Next we will analyze the behavior of the C w operator for capturing warrant.
In fact, most properties do not hold for C w , as we will see through different counterexamples.
Proposition 22
The operator C w does not satisfy inclusion, monotonicity nor semi-monotonicity.
Proof: Different counterexamples suffice.
• Inclusion: Let P = { (p, 0.7), (∼p, 0.9) }. Then C w P = { (∼p, 0.9) }, and clearly P ⊆ C w P.
• Monotonicity: Monotonicity does not hold, as can be seen from the counterexample used for monotonicity in C ; in that case, (q, 0.9) ∈ C w (P), but (q, 0.9) ∈ C w (P ∪ {(∼p, 1)}).
• Semi-monotonicity: Semi-monotonicity does not hold either for C w , as adding new defeasible clauses cannot invalidate already derivable arguments, but it can enable new ones that were not present before, thus modifying the dialectical relationships among arguments. Arguments that were warranted may therefore no longer keep that epistemic status. Consider a variant of the previous counterexample: let P = { (q, 1), (p ← q, 0.9) }. Then (p, 0.9) ∈ C w (P), as there is an argument A, p, 0.9 on the basis of P. However, (p, 0.9) ∈ C w (P ∪ {(∼p, 0.95)}), as A, p, 0.9 is defeated by B, ∼p, 0.95 , with B ={(∼p, 0.95)}. There are no more arguments to consider, and hence A, p, 0.9 is not warranted.
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Moreover, cumulativity, idempotence and right-weakening do not hold for C w , as shown in the following counterexamples. Fig. 3 . As shown in Example 23, (z, 0.7) ∈ C w (P idem ), and (q, 0.7) ∈ C w (P idem ∪ {(z, 0.7)}). However, (q, 0.7) ∈ C w (P idem ). Hence cumulativity does not hold for C w .
Example 25 Operator C w does not satisfy right weakening. Consider program P idem in Fig. 3 . Note that (p, 0.7) ∈ C w (P idem ) and (∼r, 0.9) ∈ C w (P idem ). Besides, (∼y ← p, ∼r , 1) ∈ P Π idem . However, the conclusion of this certain rule is not warranted, i.e. (∼y, 0.7) ∈ C w (P idem ), since (y, 1) ∈ P Π idem and thus there exists no argument with conclusion (∼y, 0.7) (as it would violate condition 2 in Def. 8).
The operator C w satisfies (Horn) supraclassicality as it is a direct consequence of Prop. 15.
Proposition 26
The operator C w satisfies (Horn) supraclassicality wrt C (i.e. C (P) ⊆ C w (P)).
Proof: It suffices to show that Lit P ⊆ Lit w P, or equivalently, we want to show that if (Q, 1) ∈ Lit P then (Q, 1) ∈ Lit w P.
Clearly, if (Q, 1) ∈ Lit P then can be obtained by succesive applications of INTF and MPA which do not involve any uncertain clause (otherwise, we would obtain (Q, α), with α < 1). As (Q, 1) follows directly from the certain clauses in the program P, it follows that (Q, 1) is supported by an empty argument ∅, Q, 1 .
Suppose there is a defeater for ∅, Q, 1 , let us say A , ∼ Q, α . Clearly α must be 1 (otherwise A , ∼ Q, α would not be a defeater). But from the same line of reasoning as above, A should be empty. Therefore the only possible defeater is ∅, ∼ Q, 1 . But this implies that (∼ Q, 1) ∈ Lit P and by hipothesis (Q, 1) ∈ Lit P. But this implies that the set Π of certain clauses is contradictory, and hence P is not a program (absurd). Consequently, the argument ∅, Q, 1 has no defeaters, and therefore it is warranted, so that it follows that (Q, 1) ∈ Lit w P.
Proposition 27
The operator C w satisfies subclassical cummulativity, i.e.
Proof: The proof follows the same line of reasoning as in Proposition 21.
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As for C , most non-pure logical properties for C w do not hold. In particular, C w does not satisfy the properties of LL, CC, LA, RA, RN, RM and DR. In all cases this is based on the existence of counterexamples following the same line of reasoning as for C .
Discussion
Let us briefly discuss the most relevant results provided by the properties presented before. When analyzing argumentative inference under the operator C , idempotence shows us that adding argument conclusions as new facts to a given program does not add any new inference capabilities. Cummulativity shows us that any argument obtained from a program P can be kept as an intermediate proof (lemma) to be used in building more complex arguments.
(Horn) supraclassicality indicates that every conclusion that follows via traditional SLD inference (involving only certain clauses) can be considered as a special form of argument (namely, an empty argument), whereas Horn right weakening tells us that certain rules in P-DeLP preserve the usual semantics for Horn rules (the existence of a certain rule X ← Y causes that every argument concluding Y is also an argument for X).
Computing warrant also can be better understood in the light of the logical properties for C w . There are only two properties (supraclassicality and subclassical cumulativity) which hold for this operator. Next we will briefly discuss some of the relevant properties which do not hold for C w and their relationship with argument-based inference. In [34] some examples are informally presented to show that argumentation systems should assign facts a special status, and therefore should not be cumulative. In the particular case of cumulativity (traditionally the most defended property associated with non-monotonic inference), we have shown that it does not hold for C w even when warranted conclusions are assigned the epistemic status of uncertain facts of the form (Q, α), α < 1, which provides an even stronger result than the one suggested originally in [34] . From Horn supraclassicality it follows that every conclusion obtained from certain clauses is a particular case of warranted literal.
The failure of Horn right weakening indicates that a certain rule of the form (Y ← X , 1) does not ensure that every warranted argument for (X, α) (with α < 1) implies that (Y, α) is also warranted. In fact, it can be the case that the certain fact (∼ Y , 1) is present in a given program, so that an argument for the goal Y cannot be even computed (as shown in Example 25) . In a recent paper [13] , Caminada & Amgoud identify this situation as a particular anomaly in several argumentation formalisms (e.g. [33, 26] ) and provide an interesting solution in terms of rationality postulates which -the authors claim-should hold in any well-defined argumentative system. In the case of P-DeLP the problem seems to require a different conceptualization, as the necessity degree 1 of the rule (Y ← X , 1) is attached to the rule itself, and the necessity degree of the conclusion Y depends on the necessity degree α of the antecedent X.
As an example, consider the program P = { (∼ g ← a, 1), (a, 0.7), (g ← b, 1), (b, 0.4) }. In this case, (a, 0.7) and (b, 0.4) are warranted conclusions. However, we cannot warrant g and ∼ g with necessity degree 1. In fact, only (∼ g, 0.7) can be warranted. In this respect, the behavior of strict rules (as used in most argumentation systems) seems to be different from the behavior of certain rules in our framework.
Related work
In the last years the development of combined approaches based on qualitative reasoning and uncertainty has deserved much research work [31] . Preferencebased approaches to argumentation have been developed, many of them oriented towards formalizing conflicting desires in multiagent systems [4] [5] [6] . In contrast with these preference-based approaches, the P-DeLP framework involves necessity measures explicitly attached to fuzzy formulas and the proof procedure of the underlying possibilistic fuzzy logic is used for computing the necessity measure for arguments.
There have also been generic approaches connecting defeasible reasoning and possibilistic logic (e.g. [10] ), and recently a number of hybrid approaches con-necting argumentation and uncertainty have been developed. Probabilistic Argumentation Systems [28, 29] use probabilities to compute degrees of support and plausibility of goals, related to Dempster-Shafer belief and plausibility functions. However this is not a dialectics-based framework as opposed to the one presented in this paper. In [36] a fuzzy argumentation system based on extended logic programming is proposed. In contrast with our framework, this approach relies only on fuzzy values applied to literals and there is no explicit treatment of possibilistic uncertainty.
Research in logical properties for defeasible argumentation can be traced back to Benferhat et al. [8, 9] and Vreeswijk [39, 40] . In the context of his abstract argumentation systems, Vreeswijk showed that many logical properties for non-monotonic inference relationships turned out to be counter-intuitive for argument-based systems. Benferhat et al. [8] were the first who studied argumentative inference in uncertain and inconsistent knowledge bases. They defined an argumentative consequence relationship A taking into account the existence of arguments favoring a given conclusion against the absence of arguments in favor of its contrary. In contrast, the |∼ w relationship proposed in this paper takes into account the whole dialectical analysis for arguments derivable from the program for any given goal.
In [8, 9] the authors also extend the argumentative relation A to prioritized knowledge bases, assessing weights to conclusions on the basis of the π -entailment relationship from possibilistic logic [23] . A direct comparison to our |∼ w relationship is not easy since we are using a logic programming framework and not general propositional logic, but roughly speaking while π takes into account the inconsistency degree associated with the whole knowledge base, our logic programming framework allows us to perform a dialectical analysis restricted only to conflicting arguments related with the goal being solved.
Conclusions. Future work
In this paper we have described how to model an agent's beliefs and perceptions using P-DeLP. A salient feature of P-DeLP is that it is based on two logical frameworks that have already been implemented (namely PGL [3] and DeLP [26] ). Several features leading to efficient implementations of the argumentative proof procedure described in this paper have been also recently studied, particularly those related to comparing conflicting arguments by specificity [38] and defining transformation properties for DeLP programs [15] .
In this context, P-DeLP keeps all the original features of DeLP while incorporating more expressivity and representation capabilities by means of possibilistic uncertainty and fuzzy knowledge. One particularly interesting feature of P-DeLP is the possibility of defining aggregated preference criteria by combining the necessity measures associated with arguments with other syntax-based criteria (e.g. specificity [37, 38] ).
Part of our current research work will be developed into different directions. First, we will extend the existing implementation of DeLP to incorporate the new features of P-DeLP. Second, we will apply the resulting implementation of P-DeLP to improve existing real-world applications of DeLP and to develop new ones. Finally, we will analyze extending P-DeLP to first order. It must be remarked that the Generalized Modus Ponens rule used in P-DeLP is syntactically the same as the one used in possibilistic logic [23] . As a consequence, to implement the machinery of P-DeLP the underlying possibilistic fuzzy logic PGL can be replaced by the possibilistic logic. The advantage of this approach is that the current logic programming system can be extended to first order, incorporating fuzzy unification between fuzzy constants [3] . 
